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Th aim of this paper is to present an adaptive and cost-sensitive model to prevent security intrusions. In most automated intrusion
response systems, response selection is performed locally based on current threat without using the knowledge of attacks history.
Another challenge is that a group of responses are applied without any feedback mechanism to measure the response eff ct.
We address these problems through retroactive-burst execution of responses and a Response Coordinator (RC) mechanism, the
main contributions of this work. The retroactive-burst execution consists of several burst executions of responses with, at the
end of each burst, a mechanism for measuring the eff ctiveness of the applied responses by the risk assessment component. The
appropriate combination of responses must be considered for each burst execution to mitigate the progress of the attack without
necessarily running the next round of responses, because of the impact on legitimate users. In the proposed model, there is a
multilevel response mechanism. To indicate which level is appropriate to apply based on the retroactive-burst execution, we get help
from a Response Coordinator mechanism. Th applied responses can improve the health of Applications, Kernel, Local Services,
Network Services, and Physical Status. Based on these indexes, the RC gives a general overview of an attacker’s goal in a distributed
environment.
1. Introduction
Multisteps cyberattacks are common problems in distributed
systems. Many security tools or system loggers may be
installed in distributed systems and monitor all events in
the network. Security managers often have to process huge
numbers of alerts per day produced by such tools [1].
Th Linux Trace Toolkit next generation (LTTng) [2] is
a powerful software tool that provides a detailed execution
trace of the Linux operating system with low impact. Its
counterpart, the User Space Tracer (UST) library, provides
the same trace information from user mode for middle-ware
and applications [3]. Th Target Communication Framework
(TCF) agent collects traces from multiple systems. After
collecting all traces, we need a powerful tool to monitor
the health of a large system continuously such that system
anomalies can be promptly detected and handled appropri-
ately.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are tools that monitor
systems against malicious activities. We use network-based
IDS (NIDS) to monitor the network and host-based IDS
(HIDS) to locally monitor the health of a system. IDSs are
divided into two categories: Anomaly-based and Signature-
based [4, 5] techniques. Anomaly-based detection is inter-
esting to detect unknown attack patterns and does not
need predefin d signatures. On the other hand, it suffers
from the fact that it is difficult to define normal behavior
and that malicious activity may look like normal usage
pattern [6, 7]. In signature-based techniques, we compare
captured data with well-defi ed attack patterns. Because of
the pattern matching, this technique has the advantage of
being deterministic and can be customized for each system
we want to protect. Moreover, signature-based techniques
are stateless; once an attack matches a signature, an alert is
emitted and the detection component does not record it as a
state change.
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One solution, to tackle the limitation of detection based
only on stateless signatures, is to use a finite state machine
(FSM) to track the evolution of an attack. That way, while
an attack is in progress, the state changes and we can trigger
appropriate responses based on a confidenc level threshold,
which leads to a lower false positive rate. Based on the
previous discussion about the advantages and disadvantages
between anomaly-based and signature-based techniques, and
since LTTng produces accurate traces, we decided to develop
our framework with the FSM approach in order to track
multistep attacks.
The main contributions of this work are the following.
The proposed framework has a novel response execution
organization named retroactive-burst. The term retroactive
refers to the fact that we have a mechanism for measuring
the effectiveness of the applied responses. The term burst
refers to the fact that each retroactive execution consists of
several bursts each consisting in relevant responses to apply.
The idea is that each burst mode execution of responses
in each retroactive execution must mitigate the progress of
attack and avoid the need to run another burst. In contrast to
previous models, this model is round-based. Th online risk
assessment measures the risk index of an applied round of
responses instead of one applied response. Also, a multilevel
response selection mechanism is implemented in our model.
The higher level corresponds to strong responses. This helps
to control the cost in performance and increases the intelli-
gence of the Intrusion Response System (IRS). A Response
Coordinator helps to select the appropriate level based on
a global overview of past history of applied responses and
attacks.
Th paper is organized as follows. First, we investigate ear-
lier work and several existing methods for intrusion response.
Th proposed model is discussed in Section 3. Experimental
results are given in Section 4. Finally, we conclude and future
work is discussed.
2. Related Work
Automated response systems try to be fully automated using
decision-making processes without human intervention. The
major problem in this approach is the possibility of executing
an improper response in case of problem [8]. It can be
classifi d according to the following characteristics.
Response Selection.There are three response selection models.
(a) static model maps an alert to a predefin d response.
This model is easy to build, but the major weakness is
that the response measures are predictable [9]. (b) Dynamic
model responses are based on multiple factors such as system
state, attack metrics (frequency, severity, confidence, etc.) and
network policy. In other words, the response to an attack
may not be the same depending for instance on the targeted
host. One drawback of this model is that it does not consider
intrusion damage [10, 11]. (c) Cost-sensitive model is an
interesting technique that tries to attune intrusion damage
and response cost. To measure intrusion damage, a risk
assessment component is needed [8].
Adjustment Ability. There are two types of adjustment ability.
(a) Th fi st is non-adaptive: In this model, response selection
mechanism remains the same during the attack period. It
does not use the response history to order responses. (b)
Th second is daptive. In these approaches, the system has
an appropriate ability to automatically adjust the response
selection based on success or failure of response in the past
[12].
Response Execution. There are two types of response execu-
tion [13]. (a) Th firs is burst: In this model, there is no
mechanism to measure the risk index of the host/network
once the response has been applied. Th major weakness in
this model is the cost in performance caused by applying all
responses, while a subset of the responses may be enough
to mitigate the attack. (b) The second is retroactive: in these
approaches, there is a feedback mechanism which has the
ability to measure the response effect based on the result
of the last applied response. There are some challenges in
adaptive approaches. For example, how can we measure
the success of the last applied response and how multiple
concurrent malicious activities can be handled [12]?
Foo et al. [12] proposed a graph-based approach called
ADEPTS. The responses for the affected nodes are based
on some parameters such as confidenc level of attack and
previous measurements of responses in similar cases. Thus,
ADEPTS uses a feedback mechanism to estimate the success
or failure of an applied response.
In [14], Stakhanova et al. proposed a cost-sensitive
preemptive intrusion response system. It monitors system
behavior in terms of system calls. The authors presented
a response system which is automated, cost-sensitive, pre-
emptive, and adaptive. The response is triggered before
the attack completes. There is a mapping between system
resources, response actions, and intrusion patterns which has
to be defin d in advance. Whenever a sequence of system
calls matches a prefi in a predefin d abnormal graph, the
response algorithm, based on confidenc level threshold,
decides whether to repel the attack or not. If the selected
response succeeds in mitigating the attack, its success factor
is increased by one, while on the contrary, it is decreased by
one.
In [15], Lee et al. proposed a cost-sensitive model based
on three factors: damage cost that characterizes the amount
of damage that could potentially be caused by the attacker,
operational cost that illustrates the effort for monitoring and
detecting the attacks by an IDS, and response cost that is the
cost of acting against attacks.
Retroactive approach was first proposed by Mu and Li
[8]. Th y presented a hierarchical task network planning to
repel intrusions. Thi model is able to avoid unnecessary
responses and reduce the risk of false positive response by
adjusting risk thresholds of subtasks. Th interesting idea in
this paper is response time decision-making. It can estimate
the execution time of each response. Each response has a
static risk threshold associated. Th permission for running
each response is the current risk index of the network.
In case of response execution, our technique closely
relates to [8]. Th y try to measure the risk index after running
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each response. Our experience shows that this measure is not
enough to make the decision of running the next response
and cannot be applied in a production environment. To tackle
this issue, we have defined a retroactive-burst execution
mechanism. For adjustment ability, our technique closely
relates to [14], but there are many distinguishing features.
Th y used a static damage cost for each node in abnormal
graph. In other words, their risk assessment is static. By
contrast, we have implemented a dynamic (online) risk
assessment component that helps our response component
to attune intrusion damage and response cost over time.
Another distinguishing feature that separates our model from
previous models is that the majority of the proposed response
selection mechanisms focus on the local view of threats and
responses to select a set of responses and do not have a
general view of the network status. In the proposed model,
we designed a novel approach named response coordinator
to tackle this weakness.
3. Proposed Model
To design a strong intrusion response system, we should have
a flexible response mechanism to handle different malicious
activities. Figure 1illustrates the proposed structure for such
an intrusion response system. Th proposed IRS framework
consists of five modules.
3.1. Module (1) Manager. Manager is responsible for getting
alerts from the detection and online risk assessment compo-
nents and eventually run the appropriate responses on the
attacked machine. Online risk assessment (ORA) component
guarantees that our model is cost-sensitive. ORA measures
the risk index of an applied round of responses (𝑅index). Th
detection component has all the detailed information about
the malicious activity such as the severity, the confidence
level (𝐶level), and the type of resource targeted. It sends an
alert aft r each state change in the FSM. In our FSM, a
weight is associated to each state, and the sum of all weights
is 100. Th confidenc level related to each raised alert is
equal to the sum of all weights of all previous states. The
confidenc level guarantees that our model is preemptive.
Th Activator process gets all alerts from all the compo-
nents. Once the following condition (1) is true, it starts the
Establish Remote Connection and Select Response
processes:
𝑅index × 𝐶level > Th eshold. (1)
Th Establish Remote Connection part generates a
connection string and sends it to the Open Channel process.
Th Open Channel tries to connect to a remote agent
running in the target host. Since TCF [16] is a lightweight
and extensible communication daemon, we chose it as remote
agent. After establishing a channel to the TCF remote agent,
Run Plans process applies responses on the target computer
as Figure 1illustrates.
Th Run Plans process is the core of our response frame-
work. Unlike usual response systems, it considers the time
factor and applies responses using a multistep reaction
procedure. Mu and Li [8], tried to measure the risk index
after running each response. Our experience shows that this
measure is not enough to make the decision of running the
next response.
To tackle this issue, we have defin d a round-based
response mechanism. Figure 2 illustrates six responses for
a specifi malicious activity which are ready in pending
queue in the Run Plans process before starting the fi st
round. Sending the next round of responses is based on
(1). Upon running a round of responses, new risk index of
network has to be measured from the Online Risk Assessment
component after a specifi time. As shown in Figure 2, each
response has a Response Effect that defines how the
selected responses are ordered in the pending queue. Figure 3
shows two possible scenarios after launching the first round
of responses. In the first situation, since the risk index of
the network is decreasing, the next round is not required.
This intelligence prevents overly impacting the network. By
contrast, in the second situation, in spite of the application of
the first round, the risk index shows that malicious activity is
still progressing. Thus, the second round of responses has to
be applied.
3.2. Module (2) Strategy. An intrusion can be define as any
set of actions that threaten the Confide tiality (C), Integrity
(I), Availability (A), and Performance (P) of host/network
resources such as files, kernel, or user accounts. To react
against attacks, we have designed four strategies to evaluate
all responses.
(1)MAX-Confide tiality ensures that any authorized user
can have access only to the limited subset of resources
required.
(2) MAX-Integrity verifies that any authorized user can
only modify the resources in a conform manner.
(3) Availability means that the resources are always avail-
able to the authorized users.
(4) Performance means that the system responds within
the time expected.
3.3. Module (3) Responses. Thi module is responsible for
managing the set of responses available. A database connects
the Strategy and Responses modules. This connection is a
structure to measure each response effect. Our evaluation
relies on the positive effect and negative impact of responses
to the strategies (C, I, A, and P).
3.4. Module (4) Response Coordinator (RC). Most of pro-
posed response mechanisms focus on the local view of threats
and responses and do not have a general view of the network
status. Thus, they suffer from not having global information
about the attacker’s goal. To tackle this issue, we introduce
the RC module. We divide the system status in five general
categories: Applications, Kernel, Local Services, Network
Services, and Physical Status.The purpose of RC is to improve
the quality of responses over time. Let us briefly describe the
RC categories.
Application Status. There are many applications installed
in the system like Web applications, desktop applications,
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Figure 1: Proposed architecture for automated response system.
Pending queue
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Risk indexResponse eff ctiveness
First roundSecond roundThi d round
𝑅6 𝑅5 (0.4) 𝑅4 (0.5) 𝑅3 (0.6) 𝑅2 (0.7) 𝑅1 (0.8)(0.3)
Figur e 2: Pending queue in 𝑅𝑢𝑛 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑠 process before starting the fi st round of responses.
SatisfactoryEffectiveness 
of the fi st round 
Nonsatisfactory
Stop
Run
second 
round
Second roundThi d round
Second roundThi d round
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
?
𝑅6 (0.3) 𝑅5 (0.4) 𝑅4 (0.5)
𝑅5 (0.4) 𝑅4 (0.5)𝑅6 (0.3)
Figur e 3: Two possible outcomes for decision-making after running the fi st round of responses.
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programming tools, DBMS, OpenOffi , and web browsers.
Malicious hackers are looking for vulnerabilities in these
applications. The health of these applications is very impor-
tant. AppArmor [17] or SELinux [18] are security modules for
the Linux kernel that allow associating each program with a
security policy that restricts its capabilities. Policy-based tools
improve application health.
Kernel Status. It represents the higher level of criticality of a
local system. In modern operating systems, the kernel and
the kernel modules have access to any resource of a local
machine. If an attacker gains access to the kernel, it can do
anything on the local machine with very little chance of being
detected.
Local Services Status. Virtually, each service represents a
security threat that could be exploited by an intruder to gain
further access to the system. Unlike local applications, the
local services run at a higher level of privilege and could give
attackers higher privileges if they were compromised.
Network Services Status. Like the local services, network
services represent a security risk that could be exploited
to gain access to a system. Th major difference with local
services is that they can be exploited from outside.
Physical Status. It represents the status of the physical devices
of the machine in terms of usage and performance. For
example, when a machine is under a network fl od attack,
the network interface health is considered critical. Over
time, we gather statistics about how many responses are
applied in each category. These statistics help to discover
major health problems of each host, detect major health
problems of the whole network, help administrator to chose
a policy suited for the organization, and it can help the
select response level process to select the more appro-
priate levels of responses.
3.5. Relationship between Responses and RC DB. Table 1
shows the relationship between responses and RC categories.
RC process updates Table 1 based on the plans history
database. Each response (𝑅
𝑖
) is associated with one or more
RC category (Application, Kernel, . . .). For example, in
Table 1, response 𝑅
1
is related to Application, Local Services,
and Network Services (Linked). Each RC category has a
weight (𝑊
𝑖
) which represents the importance of the category
for the organization (𝑊
𝐴
,𝑊
𝐾
,𝑊
𝐿𝑆
,𝑊
𝑁𝑆
,𝑊
𝑃
). In the online
risk assessment component, we associate each host (𝐻
𝑖
) with
a value (𝑉
𝐻𝑖
), representing the priority of this host for the
organization. In Table 1, Applied indicates that a response has
been applied and on which hosts. We activate the categories
associated with a response when the sum of the values of the
hosts which applied this response is greater than a threshold
based on the following (n is a subset of hosts that a specifi
response has been applied on them).
𝑛
∑
𝑖=1
𝑉
𝐻𝑖
> Th eshold. (2)
The status of each category of RC is computed using
Status (𝑊
𝑖
) =
Count (Activated)
Count (Linked)
. (3)
Finally, the RC index is computed using a weighted
average by (4). The result of Status and RC calculations is one
of the values: Zero (0), L (Low), M (Medium), or H (High). k
is five in our model with respect to the number of categories
defin d for system status. Consider
𝑅𝐶index =
∑
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑊
𝑖
× Status (𝑊
𝑖
)
𝑘
. (4)
3.6. Module (5) Prepare. Th prepared module is composed
of two processes and two databases.
3.6.1. Relationship between Responses and FSM DB. Each
attack pattern is associated with an FSM. For each defin d
FSM, multiple response actions can be defined in advance.
These response actions are organized in levels.
3.6.2. Plans History DB. It is a log file to store Target IP,
User Name, Date, Time, Resource, Alert Name, Level Id,
Round Responses, and Round Success. As explained in the
Manager module, it is possible that all responses are not
applied by theRun Plans process; so at the end of each round,
it will update the plans history to store the status of the round.
3.6.3. Change Response Ordering Process. Afte selecting the
appropriate level of responses required to repel the attack
(using the Select Response Level), we need to order the
responses of the selected level. Thi process guarantees that
our model is adaptive. The ordering operation has to be done
using
RE = [(Positive effect) − (Negative impact)] × Goodness.
(5)
Positive effect and Negative impact are static parameters.
Goodness is a dynamic parameter that represents the history
of success (S) or failure (F) of each response for a specifi
type of host. The goodness parameter guarantees that our
model is dynamic in case of response effectiveness and helps
IRS component to prepare the best set of response over time.
To measure the success or failure of a round of responses,
we use the result of the online risk assessment component.
As mentioned in Figure 3, if the risk index of the network is
decreasing, the next round is not required and the status of
the previous applied round is set to success. By contrast, in
the second situation, in spite of the application of the first
round, the risk index shows that malicious activity is still
progressing. Thus, the second round of responses has to be
applied, and the status of the previous applied round is set to
failure.
3.6.4. Select Response Level Process. Information coming
from the plans history database and the RC process are used
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Ta ble 1: Relationship between Responses and RC.
Response
name
RC Hosts
Application Kernel Local Services Network Services Physical H
1
H
2
H
3
H
4
. . . H
𝑛
𝑤
𝐴
𝑤
𝐾
𝑤
𝐿𝑆
𝑤
𝑁𝑆
𝑤
𝑃
VH1 VH2 VH3 VH4 . . . VH𝑛
𝑅
1
Linked Linked Linked Applied
𝑅
2
Activated Activated Linked Applied Applied Applied
𝑅
3
Activated Activated Activated Activated Applied Applied Applied
𝑅
4
Linked Linked Linked Linked Applied Applied
...
Status Medium High Zero Low Medium
Index Low
Ta ble 2: Policies for dynamic response level selection.
Policy RC.index Selected Level
P1= There is not any information in plans history
low 1
Medium 1
High 2
P2 = (The e is related information in plans history) and (Previous status was
successful) and (Time of previous run is far to current time)
Low current level
Medium current level
High current level + 1
P3 = (The e is related information in plans history) and (Previous status was
successful) and (Time of previous run is near to current time)
Low current level
Medium current level + 1
High current level + 2
P4 = (The e is related information in plans history) and (Previous status was not
successful) and (Time of previous run is far to current time)
Low current level + 1
Medium current level + 2
High current level + 3
P5 = (The e is related information in plans history) and (Previous status was not
successful) and (Time of previous run is near to current time)
Low current level + 2
Medium last level
High last level
to select the best response level to repel an intrusion in
progress. When it receives a message from the Manager mod-
ule, it tries to find related information in the plans history
database. Depending on the existing knowledge about a
similar attack and on the RC index, it selects the appropriate
level. Table 2 describes the different policies available to select
dynamically a response level.
4. Experimental Results
Th Linux Trace Toolkit next generation (LTTng) is a power-
ful software tool that provides a detailed execution trace of the
Linux operating system with a low impact on performance.
Using traces, LTTng records computer activities as seen by
the kernel and eventually the userspace applications if they
are instrumented with UST [7].
Although execution trace contains important and valu-
able information to detect system faults and network attacks,
this information is usually behind the large number of events.
Trace-based detection systems usually need a preliminary
step to alleviate this problem. Trace abstraction is one
possible solution that is used in the literature to reduce the
trace size [19], to generate high level synthetic information
[20], and to extract complete statistics of system resources
usage [21]. Thi high level information can then be used easily
in the detection phase.
In our experiments, Automated Fault Identific tion
(our IDS) [20] and our framework were developed on IP
xxx.xxx.72.12; the TCF agent and the attacked machine were
developed on IP xxx.xxx.72.131but in a virtual machine. We
have considered the Escaping a chroot jail attack. Chrooting
changes the root directory of a process. As Figure 4 illustrates,
when a process is in a chroot, it can only access a sub-
directory of the fil hierarchy and does not have access
to higher level directories. If an attacker can exploit a
vulnerability in the chroot system, it can access higher level
directories.
LTTng traces contain the related events and system
calls; the Automated Fault Identific tion component can
detect the attack using the appropriate FSM. It sends an
alarm in the IDMEF [22] format to the automated intrusion
Journal of Computer Networks and Communications 7
Ta bl e 3: Plans history database, after applying the fi st round of level1.
Target IP User Name Date Time Resource Alert Name Level Id Round Responses Response success
xxx.xxx.72.131 Smith 2012/10/02 10:05:06 Filesystem Root Chroot level1 RS1, RS2, RS4 S
Ta bl e 4: Plans history database, after applying the fi st round of level2.
Target IP User Name Date Time Resource Alert Name Level Id Round Responses Response success
xxx.xxx.72.131 Smith 2012/10/02 10:05:06 Filesystem Root Chroot level1 RS1, RS2, RS4 S
xxx.xxx.72.131 Peter 2012/10/02 10:10:23 Filesystem Root Chroot level2 RS1, RS3, RS4 S
Chroot() Open()
[same_pid()]
save pid();}
Chdir(“/”)
[same pid()]
{warning (“· · ·”);}
{fork fsm();
S0 S1 S2
Figure 4: Escaping the chroot jail.
response framework. While this attack is in progress, the state
changes and we can trigger appropriate responses based on
a confidenc level threshold. Our threshold value for (1) is
0.5. If state S1 sends an alert, since its confidenc level is 0.5
and risk index (output of online risk assessment component)
is 0.1, the rule of (1) is not triggered. If state S2 sends an
alert, since the confidenc level of S2 is 1 and the value of
risk index is 0.6, the IRS component creates a channel to the
target computer (xxx.xxx.72.131) and applies a first round of
responses through the TCF agent. Sending the next round of
responses is based on the new risk index and calculating (1).
Our framework has two response levels for this attack:
List of Responses = {
RS1:KILL PROCESS, RS2: LOCK USER,
RS3: REMOVE ALL USERS, RS4: LOGOUT,
RS5: RESET}
Level1= {Round1(RS1,RS2, RS4), Round2 (RS5)}
Level2 = {Round1(RS1,RS3, RS4), Round2 (RS5)}
4.1. First Scenario. Since the plans history database
does not have any information about this type of alarm,
select response level process selects level
1
(Policy = 𝑃
1
,
RC.index = Low). 𝑅𝑆
1
is the first response applied by the
Run Plans process. It kills the problematic processes. Then,
𝑅𝑆
2
is executed to change the current user’s password. 𝑅𝑆
4
is then executed to logout the problematic user. From this
moment, the user cannot login anymore to the machine
using its system account. Table 3 illustrates the content of the
plan history database aft r these actions have been applied.
Since round
1
causes that risk index to decrease, round
2
is
not applied and this framework keeps the impact on service
 0
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Figur e 5: Th online risk assessment result for escaping the chroot
jail.
availability to a minimum. The risk curve caused by Escaping
the chroot jail is shown in Figure 5. As seen, this attack has
two steps. The risk index of the first and second step is 0.1
and 0.6, respectively. Since the IRS component will control
this attack, the risk index will be zero after the second step.
4.2. Second Scenario. If other accounts are available on the
victim machine, the attacker may login with another account.
Suppose, at this time, that the RC index is Medium. The
next time the same attack pattern reappears, the system will
adapt its response and level
2
is selected (Policy =𝑃
3
, RC.index
= Medium). Once again the problematic process is killed
and, this time, all users on the system are removed. Table 4
illustrates the updatedplan historydatabase aft r applying
level
2
. At this point, all users of the system have been removed
and logged out.
5. Conclusion
Network services are becoming larger and increasingly com-
plex to manage. It is extremely important to maintain the
users QoS, the response time of applications, and critical
services in high demand. On the other hand, we see impres-
sive changes in the ways in which attackers gain access to
systems and infect computers. An intrusion response system
has to accurately assess the value of the loss incurred by
a compromised resource and has an accurate evaluation of
8 Journal of Computer Networks and Communications
the responses cost. The aim of this paper is introducing a
novel framework for automated intrusion response system.
In our model, unnecessary responses are controlled by an
online risk assessment component. Each response is put in a
multilevel mechanism for each FSM and run in a retroactive-
burst mode execution. This is the main contribution of this
paper.The response coordinator named RC enables us to have
a general view of applied responses history. Taking control of
the network status by RC leads us to have a reliable IRS which
keeps the network quality of service.
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